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MAINE'S NON-SHAREHOLDER
CONSTITUENCY STATUTE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1985, the Maine Legislature enacted an amendment to section
716 of the Maine Business Corporation Act which added the following paragraph to the statute:
In discharging their duties, the directors and officers may, in
considering the best interests of the corporation and of its shareholders, consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices
or other establishments of the corporation are located and all other
pertinent factors.1
This amendment, commonly referred to as a non-shareholder constituency provision, is seen by some as affecting no great change in
Maine's corporate fiduciary duty law. 2 Two significant events have
occurred, however, since the passage of this amendment which support a far broader interpretation of Maine's non-shareholder constituency provision.
First, in 1987 the Maine Legislature again amended section 716 by
adding the following new section:
A director shall not be held personally liable for monetary damages for failure to discharge any duty as a director unless the director is found not to have acted honestly or in the reasonable belief
to the best interests of the
that the action was in or not opposed
3
corporation or its shareholders.
This section, which creates a statutory business judgment rule,4
when read in conjunction with the non-shareholder constituency
portion of section 716, could allow directors to consider non-shareME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
JA-is B. ZIMPRrrCH, MAINE CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcrc § 7.7[g] at 286
(Supp. 1991). ("In practice, this likely is declaratory of existing law, implemented by
invocation of the best 'long term' interests of the corporation and its shareholders. It
is not authority to prefer the interests of other constituencies over the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders.") (footnote omitted) [hereinafter ZiAI'nrrCHJ. Although this Comment argues that Zimpritch underestimates the effects of Maine's
non-shareholder constituency statute, it should be noted that this treatise is a comprehensive and valuable source regarding Maine corporation law. Eg., Gregory S.
Fryer, Book Review: Maine CorporationLaw & Practice,44 ME. L Rav. 223 (1992)
FORMING THE
Er
(describing the value of ZIMPRITCH). See also, JOHN C. OREsTis ETAI
MAINE CORPORATION 84-86 (1986) (failing to discuss the non-shareholder constituency
amendment in its discussion of substantive amendments to title 13-A made by the
1985 Legislature).
3. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) (emphasis added).
4. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. (analyzing the 1987 amendment
to ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991)).
1.

2.
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holder constituencies ahead of shareholders and still qualify for coverage under the business judgment rule.5 Allowing directors to put
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies ahead of shareholders without recourse effects a significant departure from "existing
law."
Second, in 1989 the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine
decided Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.,
which interpreted section 716. The court stated "Maine law suggests
that the Directors of a corporation, in considering the best interests
of the shareholders and corporation, should also consider the interests of the company's employees, its customers and suppliers, and
communities in which offices of the corporation are located."'7 Although clearly an incorrect reading of the language of the statute,
and dicta besides, this interpretation is significant in that it is the
only published opinion interpreting Maine's non-shareholder constituency statute.8 Neither the Maine Legislature nor the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has refuted the Georgia-Pacificinterpretation,
which comes close to creating a duty on directors to consider nonshareholder constituencies. This interpretation represents a significant departure from Maine fiduciary duty law."
When considering these two events, especially in terms of how
they would influence a Maine court attempting to interpret section
716, it becomes harder to argue that Maine's non-shareholder constituency statute has affected no change in Maine fiduciary duty
law.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine Maine's non-shareholder constituency statute and predict its effects on corporate fiduciary duty law in Maine. In order to lay a foundation for this prediction, this Comment will discuss the development of the duty of
loyalty and duty of care doctrines in Maine; the legislative history of
5. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (arguing that the "or" used in
the 1987 amendment allows directors to qualify for coverage under the statutory business judgment rule if they have the reasonable belief that the action is in the best
interests of the corporation, but not in the best interests of the shareholders).
6. 727 F. Supp. 31 (D. Me. 1989).
7. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).

8. Since Georgia-Pacificis the only instance in which a court has discussed this
statute, any court faced with interpreting the statute would necessarily refer to that
discussion. Although the Georgia-Pacificdiscussion was dicta, it has potential for affecting subsequent readings of the statute and therefore should not be dismissed
lightly. This is particularly so because federal courts, exercising diversity jurisdiction,
so frequently have occasion to interpret state corporation law. E.g., Slattery v. Bower,
924 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1991); Twind Energy Corp. v. Maxaxam Corp., 751 F. Supp. 256
(D. Me. 1990) (both cases are instances in which 13-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 716
duties were raised in Maine's federal courts).
9. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (arguing that the case law does
not support having non-shareholder constituencies as beneficiaries of directors' fidu-

ciary duties).
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section 716; the approaches other states have taken concerning these
types of statutes; as well as the arguments that have been raised by
other commentators supporting and opposing non-shareholder constituency statutes. Drawing from this analysis, this Comment will
suggest that Maine's non-shareholder constituency statute creates
troubling authority for a potentially significant, and unintended, departure from traditional fiduciary duty principles. In order to prevent such an unintended shift in Maine law, this Comment will conclude by suggesting an appropriate interpretation for courts as well
as suggesting potential legislation which would clarify section 716.
I1. THE DUTIES OF DniEcTORs AND OFFICERS

Traditionally, the fiduciary duties imposed upon directors and officers of corporations have been divided into the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care. 10 Maine law, up to the present day, has adhered to
this legal tradition.11
The duty of loyalty, although not traditionally termed as such by
Maine courts,12 has a solid history in Maine case law. In one of the
early Maine cases on the subject, European and North American
Railway Co. v. Poor,13 the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the
Law Court, described this duty of loyalty. The court explained that
directors and managers of a corporation "place themselves in the
situation of trustees...

.All acts done by the directors officially

should be for the [stockholders'] interests. Holding a fiduciary relation they cannot be permitted to acquire interests adverse to such
relation." " As these early cases indicate, Maine's duty of loyalty
doctrine was premised upon the assumption that officers and directors occupied positions as trustees and, as a result, common law
rules were prescribed to make void any self-interested transactions,
10. E.g., EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKL LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AN DmEcroRs § 2.01 (1989) ("The legal obligations of directors and officers under
state law fall into two broad categories: a duty of care and a duty of loyalty." (citing
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Min. Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987)).
11. ZIPRrrCH, supra note 2, at 275. ("It is commonly understood in American
jurisprudence that the fiduciary duties of directors are analytically broken down primarily into the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Practitioners in Maine have
normally been guided by this duality...
."); cf., JoHN C. OREsTis ur AL, supra note
2, at 255-57 (discussing the duties of loyalty and care, although referring to the duty
of care as the "prudent person rule").
12. ZIWPRrrCH, supra note 2 at 275 ("until 1988 no decision of the Supreme Judicial Court had ever used the phrase 'duty of loyalty' in a corporate director context").
13. 59 Me. 277 (1871).
14. Id. at 278. See also Trask v. Chase, 107 Me. 137, 77 A. 698 (1910) (majority of

directors, who together owned minority of shares, breached their fiduciary duty in
voting to issue
come majority
Riley, 108 Me.
European and

more stock to one director, which caused majority of directors to begroup of shareholders); Livermore Falls Trust and Banking Co. v.
17, 21-22, 78 A. 980, 981-82 (1911) (expressing support for rationale of
N. Am. Ry. Co. v. Poor).
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regardless of fairness.15
Early treatises on Maine corporation law indicate that this view of
the duty of loyalty was the rule of law well into the early part of the
twentieth century.16 In pointing out how other jurisdictions were applying their own duties of loyalty, however, one author foresaw the
17
shift that was about to occur in the Maine doctrine.
This shift occurred in 1915 when the Law Court decided
Vermeule v. Hover,'5 which stated that the earlier rule of European
and -NorthAmerican Railway Co. v. Poor was too broad and restrictive. The Vermeule court held that "a director is not debarred, by
reason of his office, from entering into a contract with the corporation, but the contract . . . will be closely scrutinized in equity, and
set aside unless made in that entire good faith which the law demands of this species of fiduciary."'" The duty of loyalty changed
from one prohibiting virtually any dealings between the fiduciary
and the corporation to one which allowed them if they were fair.2 0 In
other words, "[p]rohibition gave way2 to permission, contingent on
good faith and substantive fairness." '
Today, the Vermeule v. Hover view of the duty of loyalty is embodied in section 716 which instructs that "[tihe directors and officers of a corporation shall exercise their powers and discharge their
duties in good faith with a view to the interests of the corporation
and of the shareholders . . . . -22 In using the words "with the view
to the interests" instead of, for example, "for the sole purpose of
15. ZIMPRITCH, supra note 2, at 274-75, 279. But cf. Symonds v. Lewis, 94 Me. 501,
48 A. 121 (1901) (holding that a director of an insolvent corporation owes trustee-like
duties to the corporation's creditors and cannot convey company assets to secure a
debt to himself, to the exclusion of other creditors).
16. IsAAc W. DYER, MAINE CORPORATION LAW § 46 (8th ed. 1913); HERBERT M.
HEATH,

A

MANUAL OF MAINE CORPORATION LAW

§ 95 (Charles L. Andrews ed., 2d ed.

1917).
17. DYER, supra note 16, at 50 ("...
[directors and managers] cannot be permitted to acquire interests adverse to such [fiduciary] relation. But it is not every transaction of benefit or interest to the corporation made by directors which will be held
as falling within the rule of European & N.A. Railway v. Poor.").
18. 113 Me. 74, 93 A. 37 (1915).
19. Id. at 78, 93 A. at 39. See also Folsom v. Smith, 113 Me. 83, 88-89, 92 A. 1003,
1005 (1915) ("So far as the corporation itself was concerned, it was not unlawful for
the directors to pay this particular debt, even if thereby they saved themselves as
guarantors."); Woodman v. Butterfield, 116 Me. 241, 248, 101 A. 25, 28 (1917) ([lit is
inequitable for a director, whose position gives him an advantage in obtaining inside
information of the affairs of the corporation, to protect his own claims against it to
the detriment of its other creditors."). This case implies that directors can maintain
claims against the corporation so long as their claims do not conflict with those of
other creditors.
20. ZIMPRITCH, supra note 2, at 279.
21. Id. at 280.
22. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1991-1992) (emphasis
added). See ZIMPRITCH, supra note 2, at 278.
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benefitting only the interests," it is clear that the Legislature did
not intend to foreclose all possible dealings between directors and
officers and their corporations.2 3 Zimpritch's treatise on Maine corporation law reiterates this view by stating that "[t]he duty of loyalty requires that the directors and officers act in a manner designed
to promote the best interests of the corporation, rather than the in'
terests of the director or officer." 24
The duty of care is the second traditional duty imposed upon directors and officers of corporations. In the early case of Bank of Mutual Redemption v. Hill,25 the Law Court described this duty as
follows:
'those who are named by companies and corporations, to have the
direction of their affairs ... are answerable, not only for any fraud
and gross negligence which they may be guilty of, but also for all
faults that are contrary to the care required of them.' The rule
there is, that they must answer for ordinary neglect; and ordinary
neglect is understood to be the omission of that care25which every
man of common prudence takes of his own concerns.
The court held that this duty of care was not only violated by intentional mismanagement, but could be breached by failure of the directors to inquire into questionable dealings.2 7 It is important to
note that when Bank of Mutual Redemption was decided there was
no judicial doctrine presuming adherence to "common prudence" as
would be developed in later cases. 28 It was strictly a fact-based
analysis.
There are relatively few Maine cases that analyze only the duty of
care, 29 and even fewer that did so before the advent of the business
judgment rule. One of these cases added to the duty of care the duty
23. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 717 (West 1981) (allowing certain trans.
actions to take place between a director and the corporation); JOHN C. ORaEsrIS r AL,
supra note 2, at § HI (IV) (referring to § 717's allowance of transactions between
directors and the corporation).
24. ZihPRrrcH, supra note 2, at 275. (citing EDWARD BRODS Y & U PATRICIA
ADAtsKi, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS ANDDiE cTRs, § 2.01 (1984)).
25. 56 Me. 385 (1868).
26. Id. at 388-89 (citations omitted) (quoting Scott v. Depeyster. 1 Edwards' Ch.
R., 547).
27. Id. at 389. ("If [the directors] did not know ... they were guilty of gross
neglect in not making the inquiries, which they were bound officially to make."). The

court also indicates that directors cannot be liable for breaches occurring before they
took office. Id. See also Woodman v. Butterfield, 116 Me. 241, 248-49, 101 A. 25, 29
(1917) (holding that an individual is not a director unless he has notice of the election
and accepts the position).
28. See infra, notes 34-42, and accompanying text (referring to the development
of the business judgment rule).
29. ZiPRiTCH, supra note 2, § 7.7[b] at 277-78 ("most if not all of the decisions
have involved loyalty issues as well") (citing Foisom v. Smith, 113 Me. 83, 92 A. 1003
(1915), as the only case which has dealt with the duty of care free of loyalty issues).
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to know the financial condition of the corporation,"0 while another
case held that a director could violate this duty of care by acquiescing to the mismanagement of others.31
The duty of care began to develop away from the traditional factbased approach when Maine courts began to express support for positions that would eventually lead to the present day business judgment rule.3 2 One of the first cases where this shift can be recognized
is Hyams v. Old Dominion Co.,33 where the court states "courts will
not undertake to control the discretionary powers of the directors
.. .[nor] undertake to pass upon the wisdom or unwisdom of such
corporate acts. ' 34 The Law Court was becoming wary of the factintensive analysis required under the old duty of care and recognized the appropriateness of allowing discretion to enter the decisions of corporate directors and officers. This can be seen in a later
case where the court was reluctant to hold a director liable to a corporation's creditors despite the director's reason to know of the corporation's insolvency when debts were incurred.3 5 By 1931 this mod-

ification to the duty of care had developed to a point where it
36
resembled the modern business judgment rule.
The modern common law business judgment rule insulates officers
and directors from liability for breaches of their duties of care or
loyalty unless their actions are found to have been motivated by

30. Clay v. Towle, 78 Me. 86, 89, 2 A. 852, 853 (1886) ("[The director's] duty
required, that he should know the financial standing of the corporation .

. . .").

See

Folsom v. Smith, 113 Me. 83, 89, 92 A. 1003, 1006 (1915) ("The duty of a director to
the corporation requires him to know its financial standing, and he is presumed to
know it.") (citing Clay v. Towle, 78 Me. at 89, 2 A. at 853); DYER, supra note 16, § 94,
at 51; HEATH, supra note 16, § 47, at 130.
31. Folsom v. Smith, 113 Me. at 90, 92 A. at 1006. See also HEATH, supra note 16,
§ 95, at 130-31.
32. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. The common law business judgment
rule protects directors from liability for breaches of duty, absent fraud or bad faith.
33. 113 Me. 294, 93 A. 747 (1915).
34. Id. at 306, 93 A. at 752.
35. Woodman v. Butterfield, 116 Me. 241, 254, 101 A. 25, 31 (1917).
We think it would be going too far, to hold that a director of a bankrupt
corporation is liable to pay to its receiver ... an amount equal to the payments which the corporation may have made in its usual course of business,
although while it was in fact insolvent, to its outside creditors direct who
had no knowledge of its insolvency, but upon indebtedness for which the
director is secondarily liable as indorser or guarantor, when it does not appear that such payments were brought about by the procurement of the
director ...

and even though it appears that the director ought to have

known the corporation was insolvent during the period when such payments were made.
36. Bates St. Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, 368, 156 A. 293, 302 (1931) ("If the
directors acted in good faith, exercising their best judgment and honestly believing
that what they did was for the benefit of the corporation, this court has no authority
to review their act, unless some peculiar feature takes the case out of the general rule
applicable to such a situation.").
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fraud or bad faith.3 7 Thus, the current duty of care in Maine requires "that degree of care and skill which ordinary prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions and...
further requires the exercise of reasonable business judgment after
reasonable factual inquiry."' 8 This duty, embodied in section 716,
was meant to create a flexible standard for officers and directors"
and to keep courts from
"inquir[ing] into and second-guess[ing]
40°
such business decisions.

In addition to analyzing how case law has functionally defined
these duties, it is also important to recognize to whom these duties
are owed. The earliest Maine cases held that these duties were owed
by the directors primarily to the corporation." In addition, these
early decisions indicate that the duties were not owed directly to the
shareholders and, as a result, the shareholders had difficulty maintaining suits against directors.4 2 As more cases arose, however, it became clear that the Law Court recognized that the beneficiaries of
these duties were both the corporation and the shareholders.' 3 This
is reflected in section 716 which reads: "The directors and officers of
37. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 353 (Me. 1988) ("it falls outside the
proper judicial domain to inquire into and second-guess the prudence of particular
business decisions honestly reached .... The business judgment rule does not, however, protect business decisions that result from fraud or bad faith."). See ZIMParrca,
supra note 2, § 7.8[b] at 290 ("In the Rosenthal decision ...the business judgement
rule was expressed as a judicial rule of deference which posits that, in the absence of
a showing that the directors acted primarily in bad faith or with fraud, it will be
presumed that the directors discharged their duties to the corporation and to the
shareholders ....").See Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577, 580 (Me.
1975) (holding that fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion are enough to eliminate
applicability of the business judgment rule). The Gay court also looks to the totality
of the circumstances to determine bad faith or abuse of discretion. See also Atlantic
Acoustical & Insulation Co. v. Moreira, 348 A.2d 263, 267 (Me. 1975) (citing M. Rv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991)).
38. ZiMPRrrCH, supra note 2, §7.7[b], at 276-76.1.
39. Id. § 7.7[b], at 277, n.170 (quoting Comments to Proposed Act § 7-16).
40. Id. § 7.8[b], at 290. (citing Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d at 353); Gay v.
Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d at 580.
41. Smith v. Poor, 40 Me. 415, 421 (1855) ("The directors of a corporation are...
the agents of the corporation, and are responsible to it for official misconduct and
fraud in the discharge of their duties.").
42. Id. at 422. ("The directors, who fraudulently abuse their trust, and misapply
the funds of the corporation, are personally liable .... But the stockholders cannot
maintain a bill to compel them to account. unless it first appear that the directors
refuse to prosecute the suit. . . ."). See Rich v. Shaw, 23 Me. 343, 344 (1843).
43. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988); Atlantic Acoustical &
Insulation Co. v. Moreira, 348 A.2d 263, 267 (Me. 1975); Bates Street Shirt Co. v.
Waite, 130 Me. 352, 358, 156 A. 293, 297 (1931); Hyams v. Old Dominion Co., 113 Me.
294, 307, 93 A. 747, 752 (1915); Livermore Falls Trust and Banking Co. v. Riley, 108
Me. 17, 21, 78 A. 980, 981 (1911); Trask v. Chase, 107 Me. 137, 144, 77 A. 698, 702
(1910); European and North American Ry. Co. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277, 278-79 (1871); see
also, JOHN C. OaRsTs ET A.T., supra note 2, at 255 ("fiduciary duties owned (sic] by
the operators of the business to the corporation and the other shareholders.").
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discharge their duties in good faith with a

view to the interests of the corporation and of the shareholders
"44

There are also several decisions which allow specific duties to run
from directors and officers of an insolvent corporationto the corporation's creditors.' 5 Zimpritch's treatise reiterates this and describes
the duty to creditors as a "fiduciary duty, of uncertain dimension,
owed by directors and officers of insolvent corporations to creditors,
which encompasses, at a minimum, the obligation not to misappropriate, convert or wrongfully divert corporate assets while the corpo4
ration is insolvent.'

6

One Maine case exists which found these duties of care and loyalty to be owed to parties other than shareholders, creditors, or the
corporation.47 These duties arose, however, because of the quasipublic nature of the corporation in that case and would not be applicable to most privately held corporations. 48 Other than this one isolated and unique case, there is no Maine case law that supports
making "other constituencies" beneficiaries of these duties, 49 and
section 716 literally allows directors and officers to consider other
constituencies only while adhering to their duties to the shareholders and the corporation. The words of the statute do not impose
upon the directors and officers the obligation to consider these other
constituencies. 50 When reading the literal words of the statute in
conjunction with the Georgia-Pacificcourt's interpretation,"1 however, it is harder to argue that no duties flow to other constituencies.
44. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) (emphasis
added).
45. Woodman v. Butterfield, 116 Me. 241, 248, 101 A. 25, 28 (1917); Symonds v.
Lewis, 94 Me. 501, 505-06, 48 A. 121, 122-23 (1901); In Re Brockway Mfg. Co., 89 Me.
121, 126, 35 A. 1012, 1013 (1896); Clay v. Towle, 78 Me. 86, 89 (1886); Bank of Mutual
Redemption v. Hill, 56 Me. 385, 388-89 (1868). See ISAAC W. DYER, supra note 16, at

51.
46.

ZIMPRrrCH, supra note 2, § 7.7[f], at 285.
47. Railroad Commissioners v. Portland and Oxford Cent. R.R. Co., 63 Me. 269,
282-83 (1872) (holding that a publicly chartered Railroad corporation was a quasipublic entity with duties to the public).

48. Id. at 277.
49. ZIMPRITCH, supra note 2, § 7.71f], at 286.
50. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) ("In discharging
their duties, the directors and officers may, in considering the best interests of the

corporation and of its shareholders, consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers .... ") (emphasis added). But see Georgia-Pacific Co. v. Great N. Nekoosa Co., 727 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Me. 1989) ("Maine law suggests that the Directors
of a corporation, in considering the best interests of the shareholders and corporation,
should also consider the interests of the company's employees, its customers and suppliers, and communities in which offices of the corporation are located.") (emphasis
added).
51. Georgia-Pacific Co. v. Great N. Nekoosa Co., 727 F. Supp. at 33.
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716 OF THE MAINE BusiNEss CORPORATION ACT
The current Maine statute that defines the duties of directors and
officers reads:
The directors and officers of a corporation shall exercise their
powers and discharge their duties in good faith with a view to the
interests of the corporation and of the shareholders and with that
degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions....
In discharging their duties, the directors and officers may, in
considering the best interests of the corporation and of its shareholders, consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices
or other establishments of the corporation are located and all other
pertinent factors.
A director shall not be held personally liable for monetary damages for failure to discharge any duty as a director unless the director is found not to have acted honestly or in the reasonable belief
that the action was in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation or its shareholders. 2
II. SECTION

The second paragraph of this section, the "other constituency"
section, was added by the Legislature in 1985. It allows directors
and officers to consider "other constituencies" as they discharge
their fiduciary duties to the corporation and the shareholders. Nevertheless, "[ilt is not authority to prefer the interests of other constituencies over the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders." 53
The legislative history of this Act indicates that this section was
part of a larger Act entitled, "AN ACT to Protect Shareholders in
Maine Corporations."" This larger bill contained provisions aimed
at protecting shareholder equity during hostile takeover situations."'
The statement of fact that accompanied this piece of legislation described its intention to
provide protection to minority shareholders in publicly-held Maine
corporations ... [and to]... clarif[y] the rights and duties of of-

ficers and directors by allowing them to consider the effects of corporate decisions upon employees, suppliers, and customers of the
corporation, as well as communities in which the corporation may
be located." 58
Also, the floor debate indicates that the bill's intention was to protect shareholders during hostile takeover situations. 7 No discussion
52.
53.

M&

Rav. STAT. ANN.tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
ZImpRrrcH, supra note 2, § 7.7[g], at 286.

54. P.L. 1985, ch. 394.
55. Id. § 3.
56. L.D. 965, Statement of Fact (112th Legis. 1985).
57. H Legis. Rec. 921-23 (1st Reg. Sess. 1985). Both majority and minority reports
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occurred during this debate to alter radically the fiduciary duties of
directors or officers of corporations."8
In comparing the "other constituency" portion of section 716 with
its legislative history, some important issues arise. It appears that
the Legislature only considered the effects of this Act in the context
of a corporate merger and the intention was to protect corporate
shareholders. The statute as it appears is not limited to merger situations, however, and therefore is currently applicable to all corporate decisions. In addition, despite the intention of the Legislature
in enacting this statute, this Comment asserts that it may actually
reduce the protections available to shareholders.
The third paragraph of section 716 was effective in 1988.0 It creates a statutory business judgment rule different from the common
0
law business judgment rule articulated in Rosenthal v. Rosenthal.
First, the statutory business judgment rule applies in situations
where a director fails to discharge any duty (not just the duty of
care or loyalty as in Rosenthal).02 Second, it creates immunity where
the director acts honestly and the director reasonably believes that
the action is in the best interests of the corporation or shareholders.8 2 This statutory standard is different from the Rosenthal (common law) standard, which allows immunity unless there is fraud or
bad faith by a director.0 3
In using "honesty or reasonable belief' instead of "fraud or bad
faith," the Legislature, in enacting this statutory business judgment
rule, sought to "eliminate the . . tests of reasonable inquiry and
reasonable business judgment in determining. . . the availability of

indemnification."'" The "reasonable belief" standard created by section 71665 is more subjective and less difficult for a director to meet
of the reporting legislative committee supported the "other constituency" version of
the bill. A member of the majority stated, "[a]ll we are trying to do is to protect those
present shareholders in Maine corporations from the intentions of those who would
come in to make a quick buck. . . ." Id. at 923. A member of the minority stated that
the "primary purpose of the bill . . . allows . . . for management to consider the

community, suppliers, customers and employees of a company when acting to determine whether a corporate merger will take place." Id. at 922.
58. Id.
59. P.L. 1987, ch. 663 § 1.
60. 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988). See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
61. Contra ZIMPRITCH, supra note 2, at 297 (arguing that "it is more likely that
the 1988 amendment ... refers to any duties under Section 716") (emphasis added).
If Zimpritch is mistaken, however, in this prediction concerning the statutory business judgment rule, the "other duties" include the duties to creditors, etc. Also, note
that the statutory business judgment rule only applies to directors and not to officers.
62. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
63. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d at 353.
64. ZIMPRrrcH, supra note 2, at 297.
65. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) ("A director shall
not be held personally liable ... unless the director is found not to have acted honestly or in the reasonable belief that the action was in or not opposed to the best
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than the Rosenthal "bad faith" standard which requires "reasonable
inquiry and reasonable business judgment."6
Another significant aspect of the 1988 amendment to section 716
is that it can be read to allow directors to qualify for the statutory
business judgment rule as long as they consider the interests of the
corporation or the shareholders.67 This differs from the other two
paragraphs of section 716 which refer to the interests of the corporation and the shareholders.6 8 If this allows the statutory business
judgment rule to be available where a director has a reasonable belief that an action is in the best interests of the corporation, but not
the shareholders, then it significantly expands the common law business judgment rule.
In summary, when reading the second and third paragraphs of
section 716 together, a director could consider non-shareholder constituencies, if in the best interests of the corporation and shareholders, without violating his statutory duty of care. If the director's
consideration of non-shareholder constituencies was not in the best
interests of the shareholders, however, but was made in the reasonable belief that it was in the best interest of the corporation, the new
statutory business judgment rule would provide immunity from
breach of the duty of care. This expansion of the business judgment
rule makes the duty of care to shareholders virtually a dead letter."
As previously indicated, the Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great
interests of the corporation or its shareholders.") (emphasis added).
66. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d at 353.
67. MF Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) ("A director shall
not be held personally liable. . . unless the director is found not to have acted honestly or in the reasonable belief that the action was in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation or its shareholders.") (emphasis added). The use of
double, and perhaps even triple negatives, in the drafting of this section makes interpretation of its meaning difficult. Although this section may be read as requiring both
interests to be considered (i.e., if it is read so that the "or not opposed to" makes the
second "or" inclusive instead of exclusive), just as strong an argument can be made
that the words "corporation or its shareholder" are meant to be exclusive. This Comment suggests a legislative amendment to clarify this wording.
68. Ma Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) ("The directors
. . . shall... discharge their duties... with a view to the interests of the corporation and of the shareholders... ") (emphasis added) ("[Tihe directors... may, in
considering the best interests of the corporation and of its shareholders .... ") (emphasis added).
69. Examples of instances in which a decision could be in the best interests of the
corporation and non-shareholder constituencies but not in the best interests of the
shareholders include the following: 1) when a corporation declines a good offer from a
bidder for the corporation that would result in potential restructuring and/or reduction of workforce; 2) when directors deride, instead of issuing dividends to shareholders, to divert the monies to non-shareholder interests that may enhance the corporation's public image; and, 3) when directors refuse to spend funds modernizing and
automating a manufacturing facility that would enhance the value of the corporation's stock in order to prevent layoffs that automation would necessitate and in order to keep the corporation's public image strong.
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Northern Nekoosa Corp. case stands as the only instance in which a
court has interpreted the non-shareholder constituency portion of
section 716.70 In this case, Georgia-Pacific made a tender offer for
the shares of Great-Northern Nekoosa Corporation. 1 After twice rejecting the proposal, the directors of Great Northern scheduled a
shareholders' meeting, at which the shareholders would vote on the
plan, on the last possible day available for such a meeting.72 Reacting to this delay, Georgia Pacific sued in federal district court seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requiring acceleration of the shareholder referendum. In its opinion
rejecting Georgia Pacific's requested relief, the court reasoned:
Certainly, 120 days is not a patently unreasonable amount of time
for the directors to marshal and present to the shareholders the
information on their position regarding the offer. This is particularly so when Maine law suggests that the Directors of a corporation, in considering the best interests of the shareholders and corporation, should also consider the interests of the company's
employees, its customers and suppliers,
and communities in which
73
offices of the corporation are located.
The above portion of the court's opinion raises two issues. First,
the court's reading that directors should consider other constituencies significantly expands the statute, which merely says that directors may consider other constituencies. 4 "Should" implies that directors might be violating their duties if they refuse to consider
these constituencies, while "may" indicates that directors can refuse
to consider these constituencies altogether.
Second, the court further expands upon the language of the statute by referring to interests of other constituencies instead of effects, as appears in the statute." The court's use of "interests" im70. 727 F. Supp. 31 (D. Me. 1989).
71. Id. at 32.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
74. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) ("[t]he directors
and officers may, in considering the best interests of the corporation and of its shareholders, consider the effects of any action upon employees. . . .") (emphasis added).
75. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) ("[t]he directors

and officers may, in considering the best interests of the corporation and of its shareholders, consider the effects of any action upon employees. . .

.")

(emphasis added).

See, James J. Hanks, Jr., Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose
Time Should Never Have Come, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1989, at 21 [hereinafter Hanks] ("Authorizing consideration of the effects of an action upon a group is more limited than
authorizing consideration of the group's interests, which may be extensive."); e.g.,
Robert M. Hart and Carol M. Degener, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes, 203

N.Y. L.J. 1, 4 (1990) [hereinafter Hart and Degener] ("To the extent such statutes
create enforceable rights for non-stockholder constituencies or permit directors to
consider their interests without regard to maximizing stockholders' values they may
lead to radically new definitions of the corporation as an amalgam of interest groups
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plies that consideration of other constituencies should be on a parity
with consideration of shareholders and the corporation. This parity
can be recognized later in the opinion where the court states:
This discussion is of great concern to the public, and the public's
interest as well as that of the shareholdersis served by letting the
discussion mature.... [H]arm may accrue to Great Northern and

the public if the deal is rushed to completion and it is then determined that the newly formed corporation is in violation of the antitrust laws.
Since Georgia-Pacific has shown no irreparable harm from the
proposed delay, and the public's, shareholders',and corporation's

interests are to some extent fostered by allowing time for both
public discussion and the anti-trust litigation to mature, the Court
will not grant the requested preliminary injunctive relief.7"
This portion of the opinion suggests that directors, when making a
decision, should consider the interests of shareholders, the corporation, and non-shareholder constituencies. However, the framework
of section 716 indicates that the directors must consider the interests of the shareholders and the corporation and, only after that
consideration, can they consider how the corporation's action will
affect other constituencies. The statute does not put the consideration of non-shareholder constituencies on parity with consideration
of shareholders and the corporation. The interpretation of the Georgia-Pacific court may undermine this portion of the statute.
Both of these issues raised by the Georgia-Pacificcourt, albeit as
dicta, suggest possible interpretive expansion of section 716 and create troubling precedent for future courts.
IV.

A.

CONSIDERATION OF NON-SHAREHOLDERS BY OTHER STATES

States with Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes

More than half of the states have passed laws that allow some
7
form of director consideration of non-shareholder constituencies. 7
in which non-stockholder interests have new rights to be heard on fundamental corporate matters . .

").

76. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F.Supp. at 34 (emphasis
added).
77. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313
(West Supp.1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2202(b)(5) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 30-1702 (Supp.
1991); iL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN, §
23-1-35-1 (Burns 1989); IowA CODE § 490.1108 (1991); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12210 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12"92(G) (West Supp.
1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1991-1992); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN.ch. 156B § 65 (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West Supp. 1992); Mss
CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon 1991); NEIL
REv. STAT. § 21-2035 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.6-1 (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-11-35 (Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKinney Supp.
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There are many variations in the statutes, but common elements of
the statutes provide a framework for analyzing them as a group.
This analysis provides insight as to how restrictive or expansive
Maine's statute is in comparison to those of other states. Next, such
an analysis can serve to provide "prototypes" for possible amendments to Maine's statute if the Legislature deems an amendment is
warranted. Finally, in recognizing how courts in other states view
these statutes, we will be better able to predict how Maine courts
will interpret section 716. The common issues arising in all of the
statutes are as follows:
1) Officers/Directors.Most of the statutes apply only to decisions
made by directors of corporations while a small minority extend to
decisions of directors and officers (as the Maine statute does).78
2) Best Interests of Corporation/Shareholders.Most states allow
non-shareholder constituencies to be taken into account only when
considering the best interests of the corporation. Only a few states,
like Maine, add
the best interests of the shareholder into this
79
consideration.

3) May/Shall. All but one statute gives the directors (and officers
if applicable) the discretion to consider the non-shareholder constituencies. Connecticut's statute requires that these constituencies be
considered. 0
4) Interests/Effects. Some statutes allow consideration of the interests of non-shareholder constituencies when making corporate
decisions, while others (such as Maine) limit consideration to the
effects such actions would have on them."
1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.13, 1701.59 (Baldwin Supp. 1991); OR. Rav. STAT.
§ 60.357 (1991); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 516, 1716, 5761 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN.
LAWS

§ 7-5.2-8 (1992); S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 47-33-4 (1991);

TENN. CODE ANN.

§

48-35-204 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (1992); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-18-201, 17-16830 (1989).
78. Those states whose statutes apply only to directors are: Connecticut, Florida,
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Now York,
Pennsylvania; those which apply to both directors and officers are: Illinois, Maine,
Wisconsin. See Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 1, col. 2; American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2261 (1990) [hereinafter Committee on Corporate
Laws]; Hanks, supra note 77, at 20.
79. Those states with statutes considering only the best interests of the corporation are: Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, Indiana, Pennsylvania; those considering both the best interests of the corporation and the shareholders are: Florida, Maine, New Mexico. See Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 4;
Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2261, 65.
80. Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 1, col. 2; Committee on Corporate Laws,
supra note 78, at 2261; Hanks, supra note 75, at 20.
81. Those states with statutes considering only interests are: Connecticut, Idaho,
Kentucky, Minnesota; those considering only effects are: Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin; (New Mexico allows consideration of both the interests and effects.); see supra, notes 75-76 and accompanying
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5) Any Decision/ParticularInstance. Most states allow consideration of non-shareholder constituencies during any corporate decision
(like Maine), while a few states limit consideration to only mergertype situations.2
6) Continued Independence of Corporation.A few statutes specifically state that the interests of these other constituencies may be
best served by the continued independence of the corporation."
Maine's statute does not contain such a provision.
7) Presumption of Validity. A few states have included sections
that create presumptions of validity on determinations concerning
non-shareholder constituencies.1 Maine's statute does not have such
a provision.
8) Specified Constituencies. All of the statutes give examples of
the constituencies intended to be considered. Some statutes limit
application to those specified, while others are not limited. Examples of those constituencies used are: employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, communities, economies, and others. Maine's statute
includes several of these and contains an "all other pertinent factors" clause that does not limit the constituencies to those
specified.85
9) Bondholders. Wyoming "permits certain publicly-traded Wyoming corporations to provide by charter for bondholder approval of
a merger or acquisition. '' ss
10) Articles of Incorporation.Georgia's statute does not automatically apply to corporations, but allows corporations to include provitext (discussing the Georgia-Pacificinterpretation of the Maine statute as applying
to interests of non-shareholder constituencies.). See also Hart and Degener, supra
note 75, at 4, col. 3; Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2261.
82. Those states with statutes that allow it on "any" decision are: Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin; those which limit it to particular instances are: Connecticut (sale of
substantially all assets) and Missouri (acquisitions). See Hart and Degener, supra
note 75, at 4; Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2262.63.
83. Those states with such statutes are: Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota,
New Mexico. See Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 4; Committee on Corporate
Laws, supra note 78, at 2261 (although the authors of the article may be incorrect in
stating, "the directors may consider the possibility that the best interests of the corporationand its stockholders may be best served by remaining independenL") (emphasis added); Hanks, supra note 75, at 21.
84. Those states are: Indiana (allowing presumption if approval of a majority of
disinterested directors, unless not made in good faith after reasonable investigation);
Pennsylvania ("absent breach of fiduciary duty, lack of good faith or self-dealing,
actions taken as a director shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the corporation."). See Hart and Degener, supra note 78, at 4, col. 3; Hanks, supra note 75, at
20-21.
85. Ma. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) ("employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located and all other pertinent factors.").
86. Hanks, supra note 78, at 21.
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sions for non-shareholders in the articles of incorporation."
Upon reviewing these statutes, it is clear that Maine's statute provides less protection for non-shareholder constituencies than some
other states' statutes. Unlike other states' statutes, Maine's is discretionary, deals only with the effects of other constituencies, specifies the best interests of the corporation and shareholders,and does
not have a presumption of validity. On the other hand, the Maine
law does provide more protection for non-shareholder constituencies
than other states. This is evident in that Maine's law applies to any
corporate decision, is available to officers and directors, and is not
restrictive in how it defines other constituencies.8 8
Despite the fact that so many states have enacted non-shareholder constituency statutes, very few courts discuss them.29 One
such case is Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier0 which deals with
Pennsylvania's statute. In the context of denying an injunction
sought by a tender offeror against the target company's board of directors, the court found that the directors' consideration of nonshareholder constituencies did not breach the duty owed to shareholders. The court held, "it was proper for the company to consider
the effects the . .. tender offer would have, if successful, on the
Company's employees, customers and community." 91 At the time of
this decision, Pennsylvania had a statute, similar to Maine's, which
allowed directors to "'consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities in
which the offices or other establishments of the corporation are located and all other pertinent factors.' "92 Although the court did not
discuss the statute further, it is clear that it found that the statute
was operative and that the statute was one component to consider in
determining whether the directors had satisfied their duties.
Amanda Acquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.93 was, like
Baron, a case in which a tender offeror sought to enjoin the actions
of the board of directors of the target corporation. Citing the Wisconsin statute,9 ' the court stated that the decision of the board was
"a business judgment call not to be second-guessed by this or any
87. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (1989); Committee on Corporate Laws, supra
note 78, at 2263.
88. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1991-1992).

89. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2267; Alexander C. Gavis, A
Framework For Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use Of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1451, 1466 (1990).
90. 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (interpreting Pennsylvania law).

91. Id. at 697.
92. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2267 (quoting 15 PA. CoNs.
1408(B) (Purdon Supp. 1986) (repealed 1986)).
93. 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (interpreting Wisconsin law).
94. Id. at 1012 (citing Wis. STAT. § 180.305).

STAT. ANN. §
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other court. The board has the responsibilityto exercise its business
judgment in accord with the best interests of the shareholders, the
company, and the other constituencies.""5 Wisconsin's statute at
that time stated, like Maine's, that directors could consider the effects of actions on constituencies. 6 In Amanda, the court expanded
the scope of the statute in much the same way that the literal meaning of Maine's statute was expanded in Georgia-Pacific.7 The
Amanda court placed the interests of the other constituencies on a
par with those of the shareholders, despite the limited scope of the
statute. This is clear when the Amanda court concluded that "the
board ha[d] acted in accord with its fiduciary responsibilities in a
manner reasonably related to the perceived threat to the corporation, its shareholders, and other constituencies."0
Amanda was appealed to the Seventh Circuit which affirmed the
decision of the lower court."' Although not focusing on the lower
court's discussion of non-shareholder constituencies, the circuit
court seemed to agree with this discussion. 100 This agreement can be
inferred from the circuit court's statement that "[s]tates could
choose to protect 'constituencies' other than stockholders. Creditors,
managers, and workers invest human rather than financial capital... .. [N]o evidence of which we are aware suggests that bidders

confiscate workers' and other participants' investments to any
greater degree than do incumbents. .. .
The above cases illustrate how courts interpret non-shareholder
constituency statutes. First, it is clear that courts have recognized
these statutes as legitimate, particularly in the context of hostile
takeovers. Second, the U.S. District Court in Amanda demonstrated
that courts can broadly interpret these statutes. 10 2 Finally, the circuit court's opinion in Amanda illustrated that individual judges
have their own views regarding corporate governance which are
bound to influence their interpretations of non-shareholder constituency statutes.
95. Id. at 1013 (emphasis added).
96. See also Hanks, supra note 78, at 21 (Wisconsin statute "substantially similar" to that of Maine).
97. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
98. Amanda Acquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. at 1016.
99. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.
1989).
100. Cf. Hanks, supra note 78, at 24 ("It is not clear that Judge Easterbrook was
talking about non-stockholder constituency statutes rather than simply protecting
specific constituencies, fraudulent conveyance statutes and plant-closing statutes.").
101. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d at 500, n.5; see
also Hanks, supra note 78, at 24.
102. Note that two courts so far have read discretionary statutes to create a requirement for directors to consider the interests of other constituencies. Thus, it becomes harder to argue that the court's reading of the Maine statute in Georgia-Pacific was just a mistake.
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B. States Without Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes
Some states have failed to enact non-shareholder constituency
statutes. Delaware is one such state. Since Delaware enjoys prominence in corporate law issues, it is useful to recognize how the courts
of that state have dealt with the interests of non-shareholder constituencies. This examination will help to determine whether it
would be possible for Maine courts to employ principles used by the
Delaware courts in interpreting Maine's non-shareholder constituency statute.
The first Delaware case to deal with this subject was Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co.103 In this case, a shareholder, who was making a hostile tender offer for the shares of his own corporation, challenged the actions of the corporation's board which made a counter
tender offer excluding the shareholder. In evaluating this defensive
measure, the court held that
[i]f a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the
takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of
such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature
and time of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on "constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally). . .. "IN
In comparing this statement with the court's recognition that the
directors' duties oblige them to act in the best interest of the corporation and shareholders, 10 5 it is clear that the court only intended
consideration of the effects on non-shareholder constituencies in the
limited instance of determining whether a defensive measure fell
within the ambit of the business judgment rule. It could be argued
that by leaving "shareholders" out of the previously cited passage
from the opinion, the directors' action could fall under the business
judgment rule as long as it was in the best interests of the corporation, regardless of the shareholders' interests. Since the court defines
"corporate enterprise" to include stockholders,20 0 however, and indicates that in addressing a takeover bid the directors have the duty
to determine whether it is in the best interests of the corporation
and the shareholders,10

7

it is clear that such an argument is unsup-

103. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
104. Id. at 955.
105. Id. ("basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in

the best interests of the corporation's stockholders").
106. Id. at 954 ("[Tihe board's power to act derives from its fundamental duty
and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from
harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source.").

107. Id. ("When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to
determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its share-
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portable. The holding is very narrow in terms of allowing consideration of other constituencies and does not suggest that directors can
consider the impact on non-shareholder constituencies at the expense of shareholders (with the exception of a shareholder initiating
a hostile tender offer).10 8
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,103 the
Delaware court explicitly indicated that a limited reading of the
Unocal holding is justified. In the context of a takeover situation,
the court stated:
Although such consideration [of non-shareholder constituencies]
may be permissible, there are fundamental limitations upon that
prerogative. A board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders. However, such concern
for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction
among active bidders is in progress .... 110
Thus when viewing Unocal and Revlon together, it is clear that the
Delaware court did not intend for the consideration of non-shareholder constituencies to preempt consideration for shareholders."1 ,
In ParamountCommunications,Inc. v. Time, Inc.11 2 the court revisited its Unocal and Revlon decisions, and although it did not discuss non-shareholder interests specifically, it "strongly affirmed the
right of directors to look beyond the short-term interests of shareholders in determining a course of action in the face of an attractive
holders.") (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 958 ("The board continues to owe Mesa [a shareholder and tender
offeror] the duties of due care and loyalty. But in the face of the destructive threat
Mesa's tender offer was perceived to pose, the board had a supervening duty to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes the other shareholders, from threatened
harm.") See also Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2258-59. See
Gavis, supra note 89, at 1467-68; but see Frank J. Garcia, ProtectingNonshareholder
Interests In The Market For Corporate Control. A Role For State Takeover Statutes, 23 U. MxcmL JJ. REFoRM 507, 518 (1990) [hereinafter Garcia] (implying that the
board is required to consider the effects on the corporation, including other
constituencies).
109. 506 A.2d 173 (DeL 1986).
110. Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
111. See Gavis, supra note 89, at 1467-68; Committee on Corporate Laws, supra
note 78, at 2259; Trevor S. Norwitz, "The Metaphysics of Time". A Radical Corporate Vision, 46 Bus. LAw. 377, 378 (1991). But cf. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance In The Age Of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L REv. 1, 40-41 (1987) ("Although Revlon should not restrict the capacity of a target's board to act for broader
constituencies when the target is not yet for sale, Revlon does not make the scope of
the Unocal concern for nonshareholder constituencies less certain."); Garcia, supra
note 108, at 519 ("Because this limitation [to the consideration of non-shareholder
constituencies] applies only when the breakup of the corporation is inevitable, it does
not squarely reverse Unocal, though it does call into question the extent of protection
nonshareholders' interests will receive.").
112. 571 A.2d 1140 (DeL 1989).
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tender offer." 113 While the Time decision is read by some as expanding Unocal and restricting Revlon,1 14 nowhere does the court
indicate support for considering the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies over the best interests of shareholders.
When viewing the above cases together, we see that the Delaware
court allows for consideration of interests of non-shareholder constituencies in the context of takeover situations. Thus, an accurate
restatement of the Delaware law on this issue is that:
[D]irectors have fiduciary responsibilities to share-holders which,
while allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of
others, compel them to find some reasonable relationship to the
long-term interests of shareholders when so doing ....
[t]his principle is modified when the decision is made to sell the company, at
which time the directors may consider only the interests of
shareholders.11n
V. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING NON-SHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENCY

STATUTES
In order to get a good sense as to the justifiability of Maine's nonshareholder constituency statute, it is instructive to look at the arguments that have been presented favoring and opposing such statutes. This examination provides a basis for predicting the potential
benefits and/or harms created by Maine's statute. Also, it shows the
issues that appear to have been overlooked by the Maine Legislature
when they enacted the 1985 amendment to section 716.
A. Arguments Supporting Non-Shareholder Constituency
Statutes
One argument raised, implicating general corporate governance issues, concerns the role that the modern corporation plays in society.
In a famous essay, E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., expressed this argument as
follows:
[T]he association ...

takes its place in a business world with cer-

tain ethical standards which appear to be developing in the direction of increased social responsibility.. . . [W]e may then ... conceive of it as a person, which, like other persons engaged in
business, is affected not only by the laws which regulate business

but by the attitude of public and business opinion as to the social
obligations of business. If a business is tending to become a profession, then a corporate person engaged in business is a professional
even though its stockholders, who take no active part in the conduct of business, may not be. Those through whom it acts may
113. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2260 (citing Communica.
tions, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150).
114. Norwitz, supra note 111, at 381-82 (1991).
115. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2261.
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therefore employ its funds in a manner appropriate to a person
practising a profession and imbued with a sense of social responsibility without thereby being guilty of a breach of trust."
Drawing from views similar to Dodd's, supporters of non-shareholder constituency statutes argue that due to the far-reaching effects of corporate action, 117 many constituencies make up the modem corporation, of which shareholders are just one constituency.'1 8
This view leads to the conclusion that corporations have social, as
well as profit-making, responsibilities to all of their constituencies""
and that non-shareholder constituency statutes allow the directors
to satisfy these responsibilities.
Another argument raised in support of these statutes deals
with the effects of corporate action and the differences between
shareholders and non-shareholder constituencies. This argument begins by recognizing that the nature of a shareholder's investment in
a corporation is generally short-term while that of non-shareholder
constituencies is long-term.12 0 Due to this difference, negative effects
of major corporate action (especially hostile takeovers) have a
greater impact upon the long-term interests of these non-shareholder constituencies than upon the short-term interests of the
shareholders. 21 Thus, since non-shareholder constituencies are less
able than shareholders to protect themselves from these negative effects (shareholders can protect themselves through diversification,
selling their stock, etc.), proponents argue that these statutes provide much-needed protection1 22 and allow a more even distribution
116. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HAzv. L Rv. 1145, 1161 (1932). But see A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HAnv. L. REv. 1365 (1932) (arguing the opposite view
in the same law review volume).
117. See, e.g., Gavis, supra note 89, at 1453 n.11 ("Employee layoffs by corporations impact upon local communities by reducing the demand for goods, services, and
housing. Increased local unemployment rates may effect local communities' ability to
provide social and educational services as a result of reduction in tax revenues.").
118. Cf. Norwitz, supra note 111, at 385 (exploring a possible policy behind the
Delaware Supreme Court's Paramount v. Time decision).
119. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2254-55.
120. Id. at 2268 ("Often the shareholder's interest in the corporation is transitory,
frequently a matter of days or weeks, while that of a manager or other employee may
embrace a career and that of a community far longer .... [a] supplier may be al.
most wholly dependent upon one corporate customer

....

"); Norwitz, supra note

111, at 387; Gavis, supra note 89, at 1451, 1470-71.
121. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism,
136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 25-28 (1987); Garcia, supra note 108, at 507, 522-25; Gavis,
supra note 89, at 1451, 1452-54.
122. Norwitz, supra note 111, at 387; Gavis, supra note 89, at 1451, 1453-54 (adding that non-shareholder constituency's ability to contract with corporation is an
inadequate protection); Garcia, supra note 108, at 507, 518, 523-25 (adding that takeovers offer incentive for shareholders to breach contracts with non-shareholder constituencies); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing The Point About State Take-
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of the gains and losses that accompany these situations.'"3
Next, proponents claim that these statutes allow flexibility in
management's responses to hostile takeovers (e.g., management is
not limited to focusing on the short-term interests of shareholders)
which will allow them to compete more effectively with German and
Japanese companies, which are focused on the long term.124 A similar argument is that these statutes will "help protect the directors
from liability and thus encourage them to resist takeover offers.' 2 5
Finally, .proponents argue that due to the effects takeovers have
on all the constituencies of corporations, including the economy and
society as a whole, legislation of this type reflects a legitimate public
policy concern. 2 ( Legislative bodies are asserted to be the proper
forums for effecting economic and social change.
B.

Arguments Opposing Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes

In 1990, the Committee on Corporate Laws on the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association voiced its opposition to
non-shareholder constituency statutes."27 The committee reasoned:
The Committee has concluded that the [Revised] Model [Business Corporation] Act should not be so amended. If and to the extent that other constituencies statutes are interpreted to impose
new powers and duties on directors, the Committee believes that
they may radically alter some of the basic premises upon which
corporation law has been constructed in this country without sufficient attention having been given to all of the economic, social, and
legal ramifications of such a change in the law. The Committee believes that other constituencies statutes may create "opportunities
for misunderstanding and thus pose potential for mischief unless
over Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1989); Hart and Degener, supra note 78, at
4; Lipton, supra note 121, at 36.
123. Hanks, supra note 78, at 20.
124. Hart and Degener, supra note 78, at 4.
By encouraging directors to resist hostile takeovers, proponents argue, such
legislation grants managements greater freedom from the constraints of
maximizing short-term profits and therefore greater flexibility to pursue
longer term strategic goals. This in turn, it is claimed, helps corporations
protected by such statutes to compete more effectively with corporations in
countries such as Japan and Germany, which tend to operate with a longer
term perspective.
(citing Management and Labor Join Forces to Stiff-Arm Raiders in Pennsylvania,
Corporate Control Alert, Jan. 1990 at 1).
125. Hanks, supra note 78, at 20. See Edward F. Greene, Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover Activity in the 1980s: The United States and Europe, 69
TEx. L. Rsv. 1539, 1564 (1991).
126. Garcia, supra note 108, at 517 ("some takeovers may function as claimed, but
...takeovers also create risks and losses for shareholders and nonshareholders as
well as for the economy and American society as a whole. These risks and losses are
considered legitimate concerns in the formulation of public policy.")
127. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78.
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the courts carefully construe them consistently with existing law.1

This disapproval, coming from an influential committee on the subject of corporate law, deserves substantial weight.
Opponents argue that general principles of corporate governance
support their position. In 1932, A. A. Berle, Jr., responding to the
views of E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,129 argued that traditional views of
corporate governance were inconsistent with notions allowing consideration of non-shareholder interests.2 0 This argument persists
today.
Berle's traditional view provides that only shareholders have
property interests in the corporation and are, as a result, entitled to
fiduciary duties arising from their ownership. Adherents of this view
believe that the interests of other constituencies are adequately protected by contract and statutes other than non-shareholder constituency provisions. 31 In holding that the primary aim of the corporation is to maximize profits for the shareholders, this traditional
model asserts that the interests of non-shareholders will be likewise
enhanced as a result of shareholder profit maximization132 In recognizing that these statutes allow (and in some instances require) directors to consider non-shareholder constituencies, opponents of
these statutes argue that the traditional model is radically altered
without much thought on the part of legislatures.ss Opponents fear
128. Id. at 2253.
129. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
130. A. A. Berle, Jr., supra note 116, at 1365.
When the fiduciary obligation of the corporate management and "control"
to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the management and "control"
become for all practical purposes absolute .... [Y]ou cannot abandon emphasis on "the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of
making profits for their stockholders" until such time as you are prepared
to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to
someone else.. . . Either you have a system based on individual ownership
of property or you do not.
Id. at 1367-68.
131. Hanks, supra note 75, at 25.
[M]any of the groups sought to be protected by these statutes are already
protected by other statutes or are parties to contracts defining their interests against the corporation. The economic interests of employees, for example, are protected by minimum wage, safety and health and plant-closing
laws in addition, in many cases, to collective bargaining agreements. Creditors are protected by fraudulent conveyance, preference and bulk transfer
statutes as well as by contract Furthermore, many of these groups are politically well-organized and influential in the legislative process.
Id.
132. Norwitz, supra note 111, at 377 (describing Adam Smith's invisible hand

theory).
133. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2253.
If and to the extent that other constituency statutes are interpreted to impose new powers and duties on directors, the Committee believes that they
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that these statutes will evolve into allowing these constituencies' interests to preempt traditional concerns for shareholder interests, to
create enforceable rights, and to provide standing for a new type of
plaintiff. 34 One commentator poses the question: If the rationale behind these statutes is sound for application to corporations, why not
apply it to trusts, limited partnerships or sole proprietorships?135 Finally, decisions concerning wealth allocation are better left to political bodies rather than to corporate directors.136
Another argument raised by opponents is that these statutes are
not needed. First, they claim that if these statutes are only aimed at
allowing consideration of non-shareholder constituencies solely in
connection with considering the corporation's best interests, then
these statutes do not change the status of current law.137 Second, the
opponents argue that the interests of the non-shareholder
constitu138
encies are adequately protected by other means.
may radically alter some of the basic premises upon which corporation law
has been constructed in this country without sufficient attention having
been given to all of the economic, social, and legal ramifications of such a
change in the law.
Id.; see also Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 4, col. 4; Hanks, supra note 75, at
20, 22. In Maine, the Legislature amended § 716 without considering fully the implications of its actions. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (referring to the
fact that the Maine Legislature only considered the non-shareholder constituency
statute in the context of hostile takeovers).
134. Hanks, supra note 75, at 25 ("By permitting directors to consider other constituencies, these statutes may give those constituencies rights enforceable against the
board . . . . If the board actually decides to consider the interests of a non-stockholder group but does a poor job, ...
is it liable to that group for either equitable
relief or money damages?").
135. Id.
136. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2270; Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 43
(1987) ("Encouraging corporations, a powerful group not directly accountable to or
representative of our society, to take positions on the controversial . . . issues of the
day also has dangerous anti-democratic implications. The proper forum for the consideration of such issues is the legislature.") (footnote omitted). See also Garcia,
supra note 108, at 517 (corporate directors "'lack political legitimacy'. . .") (quoting
Christopher J. Smart, Takeover Dangers and Non-shareholders:Who Should Be Our
Brothers' Keeper?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301, 338 (authored by Christopher J.
Smart)). But see, Norwitz, supra note 111, at 389 ("I would suggest . . . [that] the
nation's courts would be capable of rising to the task of striking a balance between
the efficient use of capital and other social goals like employment and stability-goals
which would be better for all society and not only those on Wall Street.") (emphasis
added).
137. Hanks, supra note 75, at 21 (arguing that thus, "the real purpose of nonstockholder constituency statutes must be to enable directors to provide benefits to
non-stockholder groups even when doing so would not benefit the stockholders").
138. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 75, at 2268 ("puts" to protect
bondholders, "golden parachutes," "tin parachutes," collective bargaining agreements); Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 4 (private contracts); Hanks, supra note
75, at 25 (private contracts; minimum wage, safety and health and plant closing laws;
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These critics also claim that the non-shareholder constituency
statutes are confusing to directors and courts. They argue that these
laws are vague in neglecting to define key terms and as a result provide "standard-less" direction. 13 Finally, the opponents argue that
courts will be confused in trying to appl this vague standard to
cases that arise around it. 140 One commentator argues that "it is difficult enough to determine the best interests of the corporation and
its stockholders; it will be even more difficult for directors of corporations ... to determine the interests of other constituencies, much
less weigh the often-competing claims of these groups.' ' One result

predicted to flow from this vagueness is an increase in poorer, more
arbitrary decisions by corporate directors. 42 Another predicted result is that these statutes will43deter persons from accepting positions
as directors of corporations.

Another criticism of these statutes is that they will further reduce
the ability of shareholders to hold directors accountable for their
actions.'" These provisions could allow outside directors, who by
their nature are less accountable than inside directors, to become
even less so."45 Next, "[a]ny benefit in increased latitude for board

decision-making is more than offset by countervailing costs. This is
especially true in light of the enactment in more than 40 states of
statutes designed
to reduce the risk of directors' liability for money
6
4

damages.""1

collective bargaining agreements; political influence); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA- L Rav. 1, 37 (1987) (private
contract); Gavis, supra note 89, at 1475 (contracts, successorship clauses, "silver" or
"tin parachutes," employee stock ownership plans).
139. Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 4 ("opponents blame lack of guidance
such statutes give as to how such interests should be prioritized and... overly expansive nature of the statutory language"); Hanks, supra note 75, at 24-25 (arguing
the lack of several substantive and procedural standards); Gavis, supra note 89, at
1464-65 ("None of the statutes, however, provide a coherent framework to guide directors in satisfying their duties to these constituencies.").
140. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2253; Hanks, supra note 75,
at 24.
141. Hanks, supra note 75, at 24.
142. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78, at 2269; Hanks, supra note 75,
at 24; Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of FinanceCorporatism, 136
U. PA. L REV. 1, 36-37 (1987).
143. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 75, at 2270; cf. Edward F. Greene,
Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover Activity in the 1980s: The United
States and Europe, 69 Tax L REv. 1539, 1564 (1991) ("[I]t would be very difficult for
a director to place the interests of those constituencies ahead of those of the [shareholders] and still remain in office.").
144. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 75, at 2270 ("diminish the ability
of shareholders to monitor appropriately the conduct of directors").
145. Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 4.
146. Hanks, supra note 75, at 20 (citing generally, Hanks, Evaluating Recent
State Legislation on Directorand Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification,
43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988)); see also supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (dis-
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The final argument presented by opponents to this type of legislation is that the corporation will be adversely affected. First, some
commentators contend that these acts will undermine investor confidence in the market, making it more difficult for potential investors
to predict the degree of risk associated with a corporation's stock,
and as a result will discourage capital investment in corporate
stock.1 4 7 Furthermore, while commentators admit that hostile takeovers in certain circumstances can produce beneficial results for
both shareholders and non-shareholder constituencies by replacing
inefficient management and encouraging efficient allocation of resources, 1 48 opponents claim that these statutes make it more difficult
to oust poor management
and thus promote inefficiency and under1 49
mine competitiveness.
VI.

POSSEBLE WAYS FOR MAINE COURTS TO INTERPRET MAINE'S
STATUTE

Before beginning this analysis, it is important to recognize that
courts, in interpreting statutes, are not necessarily restricted to the
exact language or legislative history of a statute. Whether intentionally or not, courts can change key terms in the statutes and can interpose their own views of corporate governance into their analysis. 5° With this concept in mind, we can explore possible ways
Maine courts could interpret section 716. This Comment contends
that there are three different scenarios of possible interpretation.
The courts could interpret the statute as not effecting any change to
prior law, as a broad expansion of the duties of directors, or as only
a limited expansion.
A.

No Change Was Intended

One possible interpretation a court could make, which is made in
Zimpritch's treatise on Maine corporate law, 51 is that the Maine
non-shareholder constituency statute merely restates existing common law. Under such an interpretation, the statute is read as consistent with Maine common law in allowing consideration of noncussing Maine statute reducing the risk of directors' liability for money damages).
147. Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 4; Hanks, supra note 75, at 25.
148. Gavis, supra note 89, at 1457.
149. Hart and Degener, supra note 75, at 4.
150. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th
Cir. 1989); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31 (D. Me.
1989).
151. ZIMPRITCH, supra note 2, at 286 ("In practice, this likely is declaratory of
existing law, implemented by invocation of the best 'long term' interests of the corporation and its shareholders"). See also Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 78,
at 2253 ("The Committee believes that other constituencies' statutes may create opportunities for misunderstanding and thus pose potential for mischief unless the
courts carefully construe them consistently with existing law.").
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shareholder constituencies as part of the "exercise of reasonable
business judgment after reasonable inquiry into the facts" required
to satisfy the good faith standard of the common law business judgment rule.152 Thus, a director could consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, but would run the risk of losing immunization from the business judgment rule thus violating the duty of
care if this consideration were not for the benefit of the corporation
and its shareholders. 18 Maine's common law and the statute itself
are consistent with such an interpretation in that neither vests duties in these non-shareholder constituencies.
Such an interpretation is supported by the legislative history of
the Act which does not state any intent to alter the scope of directors' fiduciary duties. In fact, the stated intention of the Act was to
"clarif[y] the rights and duties of officers and directors.... ""
This interpretation is also supported by looking to the experiences
of other states. First, by comparing section 716 to the statutes of
other states, it becomes apparent that support exists for an inference that the Legislature did not intend to alter the fiduciary duties
of directors and officers. This inference arises from the fact that the
Maine Legislature did not go as far as other states in seeking to
protect non-shareholder concerns. 5 5 Second, the decisions of the
Delaware courts are persuasive common law authority for this interpretation. These cases show that consideration of non-shareholders'
concerns can occur within the ambits of traditional fiduciary duty
principles, provided there are some rationally related benefits to the
shareholders.
On the other hand, there is authority for the argument against the
interpretation of Maine's non-shareholder constituency statute as
affecting no change in Maine law. First, such an interpretation
would require dismissal of the dicta of the Georgia-Pacificcase as
an incorrect reading of the statute.1 5 Second, the fact that
"[s]ection 716 also affords a basis for admitting a wide spectrum of
152.

ZIWMRTCH,

153.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

supra note 2, § 7.7[b] at 276-77 & 277 n.170.

13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) (para. 1). But

see supra note 67 (arguing that the statutory business judgment rule embodied in
M. REv. STAT. ANN.tit 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991) could be read as allowing
consideration of the corporation or the shareholders).
154. L.D. 965, Statement of Fact, supra note 56 at 11 (emphasis added).

155. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Maine's statute is discretionary;,
deals only with the effects, not interests, of other constituencies; specifies the best

interests of the corporation and shareholders; and does not contain a presumption of
validity.
156. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. (Also, the court could reiterate that the Georgia-Pacificcourt was a federal, not a state, court so the dicta has
even less persuasive authority.). See also ZtaIPrrcH, supra note 2, at 287 n.203 ("the

court, in dicta, seemed to overstate the burden of the 1985 amendment to section
716, observing that it suggests directors 'should' consider the interests of other
constituencies.").
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evidence on the effects of director action on various other constituencies""'57 would diminish a court's ability to say that this amend-

ment does not alter the common law in any meaningful way. Another issue a court would probably want to minimize is the action of
the Legislature itself; if the Legislature was not interested in changing the status quo, why did it pass the amendment. In addition,
since the Legislature passed another amendment three years later
that broadened the immunity available to directors, it is more difficult to argue that no alteration to the status quo was intended.' 8
B. A Broad Change Was Intended
A Maine court might also interpret this statute as effecting a
broad change in traditional fiduciary duty doctrine. First, in looking
at the legislative history of this statute, it is clear that the Legislature was reacting to what it perceived as a threat-hostile takeovers.
This history supports reading the statute as an attempt to change
existing law. 5 9 The fact that the Legislature enacted a further
amendment that broadened the availability of the business judgment rule and allowed preemption of shareholder interests also supports such a broad interpretation of this statute. By interpreting the
statute as effecting a broad change in traditional fiduciary duty law,
it reconciles the apparent contradictions currently existing at common law.
Georgia-Pacificprovides persuasive authority for such an interpretation. That court stated: "Maine law suggests that the Directors
of a corporation, in considering the best interests of the shareholders
and corporation, should also consider the interests of the company's
employees, its customers and suppliers, and communities in which
offices of the corporation are located."'8 6 Persuasive authority arises
from the Amanda cases, where other federal courts made similar interpretations of state non-shareholder constituency statutes. In addition, the arguments supporting non-shareholder constituency statutes can provide policy justification for such a broad interpretation.
One issue that must be addressed under this interpretation is the
somewhat mild language employed by the drafters of section 716
157. ZIMPRITCH, supra note 2, at 286 n.201.
158. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (referring to the 1987 amendment to Ms. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991)).
159. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text; L.D. 965, Statement of Fact
(112th Legis. 1985) ("[The bill] clarifies the rights and duties of officers and directors
by allowing them to consider the effects of corporate decisions upon employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation .

. . .");

Legis. Rec. 922 (1985) ("primary

purpose of the bill ... allows ...management to consider the community, suppliers,
customers, and employees of a company when acting to determine whether a corporate merger will take place").
160. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. at 33 (emphasis added).
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compared with the language of other states' statutes. There is also a
contradiction raised by this broad interpretation of the statute in
that the legislative history for section 716 indicates that this amendment was considered primarily in the context of hostile takeovers,
even though the version of the bill enacted contained no such
limitation.
C. Limited Expansion of Fiduciary Duties
Finally, a Maine court could interpret this statute as slightly
broadening the discretion available to directors and officers of
Maine corporations as they react to takeover situations. This interpretation would allow directors and officers to consider other constituencies, in takeover situations, as long as the directors are acting
in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. Such an
interpretation would not allow directors to put the interests of these
other constituencies ahead of the corporation or shareholders, nor
grant enforceable duties to these other constituencies. This is the
view that this Comment endorses as most supportable.
The development of Maine's common law of fiduciary duty would
support such an interpretation. What began as rigid, trustee-like duties developed over time into relationships that allowed directors a
good degree of flexibility in their dealings and decisions. This development is consistent with a reading of the statute that recognizes a
slight broadening of the considerations that directors and officers
can take into account in making certain types of decisions. In addition, the fact that Maine case law does not recognize instances in
which the duties flow to other constituencies 6' lends further support for such an interpretation.
The legislative history of this statute supports this interpretation
more than it does the other two possible readings. First, the fact
that the Legislature enacted this bill is evidence indicating that the
lawmakers did not intend to restate the status of existing law, since
legislation is normally enacted to effect change. Second, the legislative history indicates that consideration of this measure occurred exclusively in the context of preventing hostile takeovers and no mention of an intent to significantly alter fiduciary duty principles
exists. Finally, since the Act was debated as a measure intended to
protect shareholders, this interpretation would provide shareholders
with protection from the perceived damage done to corporations in
the event of a hostile takeover. At the same time, it would protect
the duties owed to them by directors and officers from substantial
dilution.
161.

See supra, notes 41-49 and accompanying text. Only one Maine case allows

duties to flow to other constituencies, and this was in a unique situation where a
corporation was found to be quasi-public.
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The experiences of other states provide persuasive authority for
such a limited interpretation of the statute. First, a comparison of
Maine's statute to those of other states, supports an interpretation
that allows, but does not require, directors to consider other constituencies.182 Second, since Maine included in the language provision
10 3
for "the best interests of the corporation and of its shareholders,
unlike other states that mention only the corporation, an inference
arises that the Legislature did not intend for consideration of other
constituencies to preempt the interests of shareholders. Finally,
Maine's statute refers to consideration of the effects10 4 (a limited
term) on non-shareholder constituencies instead of interests (a
broader term) employed by some other states, providing support for
the limited reading of the statute. 6 5
Under such an interpretation, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great
6 6 would be incorrect in
Northern Nekoosa Corp.1
its reading of section 716. This would not be a disastrous finding since (1) the legislative history and language of the statute itself do not seem to support
the Georgia-Pacificinterpretation; and (2) Georgia-Pacificwas a decision of a federal court and therefore has only persuasive, not binding, influence on Maine state courts.
Following this interpretation, the question remains, however, why
the Legislature neglected to limit the statute's applicability to hostile takeover situations. Perhaps the only response is that there is no
evidence of an intent to make it applicable to non-takeover
situations.
D. Recommended Legislative Action
Although this Comment argues that the most supportable interpretation of this statute is one allowing a limited expansion of the
fiduciary duty doctrine limited to hostile takeover situations, there
is a very real threat that a court could adopt a far broader
interpretation.
To prevent such a broad change in fiduciary duty law, which this
author argues was unintended, the Legislature should consider clarifying the statute as follows.
162.
eration
require
163.
added).

See supra note 79 and accompanying text. If Maine wanted to make considmandatory it could have employed language, as Connecticut did, that would
directors to consider other constituencies.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1991-1992) (emphasis

164. ME.

REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
165. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1991-1992) refers to interests of shareholders and the corporation while only referring to the effects on nonshareholder constituencies. This leads to an inference that the drafters did not intend
the shareholders to be preempted by consideration for non-shareholders.
166. 727 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Me. 1989).
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The directors and officers of a corporation shall exercise their
powers and discharge their duties in good faith with a view to the
interests of the corporation and of the shareholders and with that
degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.
In discharging their duties as they respond to control-shifting
situations, the directors and officers may, but are not required, in
considering the best interests of the corporation and of its shareholders, consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices
or other establishments of the corporation are located and all other
pertinent factors.
A director shall not be held personally liable for monetary damages for failure to discharge any duty as a director unless the director is found not to have acted honestly, not to have acted in the
reasonable belief that the action was in the best interests of the
corporationand its shareholders,or not to have acted in the reasonable belief that the action was not opposed to the best interests of the corporationand its shareholders.

Such an amendment would clarify the statute and bring it in line
with the Legislature's intent. It would limit the explicit allowance of
consideration of non-shareholder constituencies to hostile takeovertype situations-as the Legislature intended. It would clarify the
statutory business judgment rule so that consideration of non-share-

holder constituencies would not be allowed to preempt a director's
duties to the shareholders or to the corporation. Finally, this amendment would reduce the potential for confusion that exists as a result
of the Georgia-Pacificinterpretation of section 716.

In conclusion, Maine's non-shareholder constituency statute is
vague and, as a result, has the potential for being read expansively.
Since the only court that has interpreted this statute has read it

expansively, the likelihood of future expansive interpretations becomes even greater. Only through a narrow interpretation, or
through amendment, can this statute be brought into harmony with
its legislative intent and with common law.
John A. Anderson

